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In today’s globalized world, we frequently encounter unfamiliar events that we may have
difficulty comprehending – and in turn remembering – due to a lack of appropriate
schemata. This research investigated schema effects in a situation where participants
established a complex new schema for an unfamiliar type of story through exposure to
four variations. We found that immediate recall increased across subsequent stories and
that distortions occurred less frequently – participants built on the emerging schema and
gradually established representations of parts of the story that were initially transformed.
In recall with delays increasing up to 1 month, quantitative measures indicated forgetting
while distortions increased. The second focus of this research was on content and order
deviation effects on recall. The content deviation, in contrast with previous repeated-
event research, was not rememberedwell andwas associatedwith lower recall; the order
deviation had a similar (but expected) effect.We discuss discrepancies between results of
this study and previous literature, which had focused on schemata for familiar events, in
relation to stages of schema development: it seems that in unfamiliar repeated events, a
complex new schema is in the early stages of formation, where the lack of attentional
resources limits active processing of deviations.
Two men from Edulac went fishing. (participant’s first recall, Bartlett, 1932, p. 66)
Bartlett (1932) demonstrated that parts of an unfamiliar storymay become distorted in
the process of remembering (see also Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Roediger, Bergman, &
Meade, 2000). In one of Bartlett’s (1932) experiments, participants were presented with
an adapted version of aNorthAmerican folktaleTheWar of theGhosts,which startedwith
the following line: ‘One night two youngmen from Egulacwent down to the river to hunt
seals. . .’. Bartlett’s participants were then asked to reproduce the story repeatedly with
increasing delay. In their reproductions, participants often left out or transformed parts
that were most disjoint to their pre-existing knowledge (i.e., parts they had difficulty
comprehending; Bartlett, 1932; see also Beals, 1998; Billig, 1990; Edwards & Middleton,
1987). The initial quote shows an example – the participant changed ‘hunt seals’ into the
more familiar ‘fishing’ and ‘Egulac’ into ‘Edulac’. In today’s globalized world, we
frequently encounter unfamiliar events thatwemayhave difficulty comprehending due to
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Eva Rubınova, Department of Psychology, University of Portsmouth, King Henry
Building, King Henry I Street, PO1 2DY Portsmouth, Hampshire, UK (email: eva.rubinova@gmail.com).
DOI:10.1111/bjop.12449
1
lack of appropriate schemata.Watching a gameof cricketmay serve as an example – a first-
timer would probably not understand much of what is going on, and if asked to recall the
event later, they would likely need to borrow terms they know from different sports,
misinterpret certain actions, and overall not remember verymuch.What if, however, one
had a chance to become familiar with the event through exposure to several examples –
would we still observe distortions?
Repeated experience leads, through the process of abstracting shared parts of events,
to the emergence of a schema, a generic cognitive structure that consists of information
about content and temporal order of events (i.e., a script), layout of spaces, and rules or
associations between objects (Abelson, 1981; Ahn, Brewer, 2000; Brewer, & Mooney,
1992; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Nørby, 2015; Posner & Keele,
1968; Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012; Rumelhart, Smolensky,
McClelland, & Hinton, 1986; Schank, 1999; Schank & Abelson, 1975; van Kesteren,
Rijpkema, Ruiter, & Fernandez, 2013). Repeated-event research from experimental as
well as naturalistic settings has investigated various consequences that newly established
schemata have on the ability to recall specific details of events that were similar to each
other. In general, schemata facilitate memory for what typically happened but are less
helpful when the task is to recall details that varied across instances (e.g., Farrar &
Goodman, 1992; Fivush, 1984; Freeman, Romney, & Freeman, 1987; McNichol, Shute, &
Tucker, 1999; Neisser, 1981; Woiwod, Fitzgerald, Sheahan, Price, & Connolly, 2019).
There is an exception to the latter principle, however, when changes in details are so
unexpected as to be perceived as outright deviations, in which case these deviations are
remembered well (Brubacher, Glisic, Roberts, & Powell, 2011; Connolly, Gordon,
Woiwod,&Price, 2016;Greve, Cooper, Tibon&Henson, 2019;MacLean,Coburn,Chong,
& Connolly, 2018).
Previous studies, however, typically investigated familiar repeated events such as play
activities, tasting sessions, school days, and group meetings and discussions, so new
schemata were rather adaptations of old schemata than complex new structures.1 Given
that people experience repeated unfamiliar events in many different contexts (when they
travel to countries with a different culture, play a new board game, learn to drive, or switch
to a new operation system) and sometimes need to recall details of these events for
investigative purposes (e.g., in cases of industrial accidents; Kelloway, Stinson, &MacLean,
2004), we need to gain better understanding of howmemory for such events develops and
how such events are remembered. In the present research, we used a set of variations of an
unfamiliar story in a repeated-event paradigm, and we followed participants’ recall using a
method of repeated reproduction with increasing delay. This unique combination of
methodologies enabled us to examine (1) schema formation for unfamiliar material and
effects associated with cultural schemata as well as (2) phenomena specific for repeated
events, such as accuracy of recall instances and effects of deviations.
Conventionalization and unfamiliar stimuli
‘When cultural material is introduced into a group from the outside it suffers change until
it eventually either disappears or reaches a new stable form’ (Bartlett, 1932, p. 268). This
process of conventionalization illustrates socio-cultural influences on remembering that
1We would like to note that schema establishment for any new human experience, even in the case of unfamiliar events, never
occurs from a ‘blank slate’, because there are always aspects that are familiar (e.g., subjects, objects, and various actions in
isolation). In this research, we focus on events that are unfamiliar as a whole and that lead to complex schema adaptations.
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involve assimilation of unfamiliar forms to familiar ones often through processes of
rationalization, simplification, and social constructiveness that may result in distortion
(Bartlett, 1932; Collins, 2006; Northway, 1940a, 1940b; Saito, 2000).2
Transformations (or distortions) as a result of constructive processes apparent in recall
have been documented in studies using familiar and unfamiliar material with the method
of repeated reproduction. Bergman and Roediger (1999) and Wagoner and Gillespie
(2014) replicated Bartlett’s experiment using theWarof theGhosts story and showed that
memory distortions tend to be maintained across repeated tests while accurate recall
decreases due to forgetting. Wheeler and Roediger (1992) reported similar results with
the use of familiarmaterials.3 Bartlett (1932) furthermentioned that some distortions only
occurred at longer retrieval attempts. This would likely happen in cases where a new
schema is still separating from existing schemata. The relative persistence of distortion in
delayed recall documented by Bergman and Roediger (1999) and Wagoner and Gillespie
(2014) exemplify the conservative nature of stabilized schemata (Collins, 2006; Ost &
Costall, 2002).
Remembering repeated events
In everyday life, people form routines, follow procedures, and create preferred ways for
completing complex tasks.4 From this perspective, our lives largely seem a collection of
repeated events (Brown, 2016). Two decades of research into children’s memory for
repeated events and emerging literature on adults’ memory for repeated events suggest
that people tend to remember the content and structure of how things typically happen
(Woiwod et al., 2019).When asked about details of a specific event, participants are often
confused about when details occurred, may provide inconsistent reports across repeated
interviews, and in turnmay seemunreliable (Connolly&Price, 2013; Freeman et al., 1987;
Neisser, 1981; Price, Connolly, &Gordon, 2016;Weinsheimer, Coburn, Chong, MacLean,
& Connolly, 2017; Woiwod & Connolly, 2017).
The source monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;
Lindsay, 2008, 2014; Lindsay & Johnson, 2000) is a useful approach that may help us
understand why difficulties in remembering details of an instance from a repeated event
occur. The SMF is based on the assumption that memory processes at all stages involve
multiple systems that work in parallel (Johnson et al., 1993; see also McClelland &
Rumelhart, 1985; Rumelhart et al., 1986). During retrieval of a specific detail, these
systems give rise to a host of surface-level and generic characteristics that aid the process
of attributing the detail to a specific source (Lindsay, 2008). In repeated events, many of
these characteristics overlap,whichmay lead to erroneous attributions (i.e., confusions of
details across instances), unless a detail is associated with unique characteristics. There
2 Cole and Cole (2000) elaborated on Bartlett’s notion of conventionalization and suggested that it entails transformative as well
as generative processes (i.e., that conventionalization involves processes of assimilation of details as well as accommodation of
schemata). In this study, we use a narrower interpretation of conventionalization as a transformative and constructive process that
is driven by an established schema (e.g., transformation of ‘hunting seals’ into ‘fishing’ or recall of ‘totem’ that never actually
occurred in War of the Ghosts; Bartlett, 1932).
3Gauld and Stephenson (1967) studied conditions that may limit distortions in recall and suggested that strict recall instructions
and an opportunity to identify errors in participants’ own reproductions have such an effect.
4 Imagine a personalizedMonday morning routine of an academic. She enters the office at 9.00 and engages in a brief discussion
about the weekend. She then pours coffee that one of her colleagues (who arrives to the office earlier and has a different routine)
hadmade. Until 9.30, she answers emails while sipping coffee. After that, she starts revising slides for an upcoming lecture that she
gives at 10.00.
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are two examples of such stronger bounds between details and their source in repeated
events: (1) primacy (and sometimes also recency) effects, when recall of the first (and
sometimes the last) instance from a repeated event is higher and contains fewer
confusions than recall of other instances; and (2) deviation effects, when an instance that
was different from others is recalled better than non-deviation instances (Connolly et al.,
2016; Greve et al., 2019; MacLean et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2015; Rubınova, Blank, Ost,
& Fitzgerald, 2020). The latter effect is typically associated with a content deviation such
as anewactivity or an interruptionpresent in one instance and is consistentwith literature
examining deviation effects presented in a scripted text, where recall of script-
interruptive, bizarre, or vivid irrelevant details was found to be similar or better than
recall of script-typical details (Davidson, 1994; Davidson, Malmstrom, Burdenand, & Luo,
2000).
An event may also deviate in terms of temporal structure (i.e., when an established
arbitrary order of actions changes in one instance), and such deviation seems to have a
disruptive effect on recall and source memory of all instances, possibly due to
compromising the schematic basis that otherwise aids comprehension (Ohtsuka &
Brewer, 1992) and recall (Rubınova et al., 2020).5 Recent research also suggested that
being aware (i.e., remembering) that a deviation occurred may be key to understanding
deviation effects: a deviation of contentwas associatedwith high deviation awareness and
better recall, while a deviation of order was associated with low deviation awareness and
poorer recall (Rubınova et al., 2020).
Current study
In the present study, we combined methodologies to answer questions pertaining (1) to
schema formation and persistence of memory distortion in repeated unfamiliar events,
and (2) to the generalizability of effects found in the repeated-event literature that are
based on familiar stimuli. We presented participants with four versions of an unfamiliar
story and asked them to recall each story shortly after its presentation (immediate recall),
and then again four more times with delays increasing from 10 min to 1 month (delayed
recall). In addition, we investigated effects of content and order deviations on delayed
recall of unfamiliar stories. For different subsets of participants, in the fourth and final
story, we introduced a content deviation (a change in behaviour of the characters),6 an
order deviation (a change in the sequence of actions), or both content and order
deviations.
With regard to schema formation, we hypothesized that participants’ initial recall of
the first story – after their first experience with the unfamiliar material –would be lower
than their initial recall of the subsequent stories due to gradual establishment of the
schema (e.g., Fivush, 1984; Schank, 1999). Relatedly, we expected that as participants
becamemore familiarwith thematerial and built a new schema, the number of distortions
in initial recall would decrease between the first and subsequent stories (i.e., initial
distortions would be corrected). We planned exploratory analyses of distortions in
5 In the context of an order deviation in a (single) story, Mandler and Johnson (1977) suggested that an apparent order deviation
may lead to better recall of the story in the short term. ‘However, the longer the delay between telling and recall, themore recall will
come to approximate an ideal schema instead of the actual story heard’ (p. 132).
6 The content deviation we used would correspond to a vivid schema-inconsistent detail that did not have consequences for the
story in terminology used by researchers examining deviation details in scripted stories (e.g., Davidson, 1994), as it involved a
change of the ritualistic behaviour enacted by the couple at the end of the story.
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delayed recall to see if occurrence of distortions was stable across time or would show
increasing tendencies (Bartlett, 1932).
In delayed recall, based on previous repeated-event research using familiar materials,
we should expect (1) primacy and recency effects – higher recall and better source
monitoring in Story 1 and Story 4 than in the middle stories (MacLean et al., 2018;
Rubınova et al., 2020), (2) positive effects of the content deviation on recall (e.g., Price
et al., 2016), and (3) negative effects of the order deviation on recall (Rubınova et al.,
2020).Whether these effects are generalizable to repeated unfamiliar events remains to be
established and thereforewe regarded these analyses as exploratory. Finally,we expected
that participants who would be aware that a deviation occurred would have better




This study was a 4 (story: 1/2/3/4) 9 4 (session: 1/2/3/4) 9 2 (content: typical/
deviation) 9 2 (order: typical/deviation)mixeddesign. Content andorderwere between-
subjects factors; story and session were within-subjects factors.
Participants
Sample
One hundred and forty-nine participants took part in this experiment. Participants were
recruited through the university undergraduate participant pool and received two
research credits for completing the study. We used the following inclusion criteria: age
over 18 years, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, and fluent English-
speaking ability. There were 38 males and 111 females aged between 16 and 64 years
(M = 20.15, SD = 6.02). Data from one female participant were excluded from the final
sample due to familiarity with the materials.7 Participants were randomly allocated to
one of four conditions: there were 37 participants in the typical content and order
condition, 39 participants in the changed content condition, 36 participants in the
changed order condition, and 36 participants in the changed both content and order
condition.
Partially missing data and exclusions
We had complete data from 129 participants and partial data from 19 participants. Partial
or complete recall from Session 1 was missing from five participants due to a technical
fault. Data from Session 2 and 4 were missing from one participant, two participants did
not complete Session 3 and4, and a further six participants did not complete Session4.We
additionally excludedpartial data fromSessions 3 and4 fromfiveparticipantswhose recall
was identical to one of the previous online sessions (i.e., including typos; participants
7 The participantwas a research assistant of a colleague andwas exposed to the story videos onmultiple occasions prior to signing-
up for the experiment.
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probably saved a record of their recall and copy-pasted it in later sessions). For further
details and explanations of data exclusion, see Appendix S1 (OSM, https://osf.io/jhrtc/).
Materials
The stimuli were adapted from Ahn et al. (1992, Experiment 2). We simplified and
shortened their passage of a Korean Wedding Ceremony (see appendix 1 in Ahn et al.,
1992), and varied details and wording of some parts to create four stories depicting the
same event (please note that these stories were not labelled as a wedding ceremony; see
Table 1 for a list of story-specific details and Appendix 1 for an example story). The stories
were presented as videos showing hand-drawn illustrations of the scenes.8 Each storywas
read-out by one of four native English speakers (two younger-adult male and female voices
and two older-adult male and female voices; for all video examples, see OSM, https://osf.
io/jhrtc/). The order of stories was counterbalanced across participants.
Each participant watched four stories. Stories 1–3 were a variation on the same event
and served to establish the schema. Depending on the condition, changes were
introduced in the fourth story. In the typical content and typical order condition, the final
story was another variation on the same event. In the deviation content conditions, the
ritualized actions of the main characters at the end of the final story were changed (see
Themes 13 and 14 in Table 2). In the deviation order conditions, the actions of the final
story remained unchanged, butwere revealed in a different order in themiddle part of the
story (the beginning and ending remained the same; see Table 2). The stimuli were
counterbalanced across participants (see OSM, https://osf.io/jhrtc/).
Procedure
Session 1
After participants read the information sheet and signed informed consent, the
administrator briefed them about the procedure described below and summarized that
the study had three further online parts forwhich theywould receive links 1 day, 1 week,
and 1 month later (participants were not told what the purpose of the online parts was,
only that they would need approximately 15 min to complete each of them). The whole
experiment was administered on a computer with, a paper-based distractor task. After
demographic/screening question and basic instructions asking the participants to pay
attention to the stories as they would be asked to recall them later, participants watched
the first video (Story 1) two times in a row. A 1-min arithmetic filler task followed, after
which instructions for immediate recall appeared: ‘Nowplease type in asmuch as you can
remember from Story 1. Try to ensure that your reproduction is as close to the original
story as possible, including as many details as you can. Take your time and revise your
reproduction until you cannot remember anymore. Please do not guess. Once you cannot
remember any more, please continue to the next task’. A 2-min dot connecting distractor
task followed. The exact same procedure (includingwatching each story twice) was then
repeated for Stories 2, 3, and 4. Participants then completed a 10-min visual-spatial
distractor task. The first delayed recall task followed: participants were asked to recall as
much as they could remember from each story. The recall task was presented on four
8We decided to present the stories in an audio-visual form (rather than asking participants to read the stories from text) because
we believed that this would increase participants’ engagement with the materials.
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pages entitled with ‘Story 1’ (page 1, ‘Story 2’ on page 2, etc.) and illustrations of the boy
and the girl as cues (participants could switch between the pages).
Sessions 2 and 3
One day and one week after Session 1, respectively, participants received an online
answer form similar to the delayed recall task described under Session 1. Participants
completed Session 2 between 0.81 and 5.91 days9 (M = 1.60, SD = 0.71) and Session 3
between 6.08 and 15.91 days (M = 8.13, SD = 1.67). In both sessions, there were few
participants at the late extremes and the smallest interval between Sessions 2 and 3 was
2 days, so we decided not to exclude any data from these sessions.10
Session 4
One month after Session 1, participants received another delayed recall online form.
Participants completed this part between 27.82 and 68.09 days (M = 29.80, SD = 4.19).
There were again few participants at the extreme, so we decided not to exclude any data
from this session. After the recall phase, we asked participants to describe any shared
elements and any differences they might have noticed between the stories. Finally, we
asked participants what they thought the stories were describing.
Measures and coding
Each story consisted of 15 themes, which translated into 76 idea units (these included 11
details that varied across the stories and 4 details that were consistent but changed in the
fourth story in the content deviation conditions). From the rich recall data, we created
measures of quantity, source monitoring, quality, and recall organization (Sessions 1–4).
From the follow-up questions (end of Session 4), we coded any mentions of the
occurrence of deviations (i.e., deviation awareness), and a general event representation
(i.e., what did the stories describe). Recall quantitywas reflected in a coarse-grainmeasure
of themes (maximum 15 per story; Table 2) and a fine-grain measure of idea units
(maximum 76 per story; after Mandler & Johnson, 1977), both coded based on the
meaning and not verbatim reproduction. Specific details were a measure of quantity that
also reflected accuracy of recall (see example below). A total of 15 details were coded: 11
details that varied across stories (Table 1) and 4 details that changed in the content
deviation conditions. Sourcemonitoringwas reflected in ameasure of internal intrusions/
source confusions of details (maximum 15 per story). Recall quality was reflected in a
measure of distortions of idea units (maximum 76 per story). Recall organization was
measured as the sum of pairs of themes that were recalled in the correct order (maximum
14 per story). Deviation awareness reflected participants’ mentioning of the content and/
or order deviation (yes/no). Participants’ descriptions of the stories were categorized and
reflected in a measure of general event representation.
Recall of themes was coded as 1 = present, 0.5 = partially present/incomplete, or
0 = absent themes. Recall of idea units was coded as 1 = present or 0 = absent; recall of
9 There were two participants who completed Session 2 after 6 and 11 days, respectively, and who did not complete any further
sessions. In order to reduce the range of delay in Session 2, we treated these data as answers from Session 3 (seeOSM, https://osf.
io/jhrtc/).
10 Excluding the participants at the extremes would not change the results.
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details was coded as 1 = correctly recalled or 0 = incorrectly recalled/absent. Details that
were attributed to an incorrect story were coded as internal intrusions. For example, the
following passage: ‘James’1 family friend2 Ms Evans3 visited4 Linda’s5 parents6 [. . .] and
told7 them about James’8 education9 and personality10’ was coded as 2 themes (Theme 2
and 3 in Table 2), 10 idea units (each marked with a superscript), 2 details (underlined),
and 1 internal intrusion (in italics). For statistical analyses, themes, idea units, details, and
internal intrusions were converted into a proportion.
Qualitative recall measures reflected five types of recall transformations that were,
for the purpose of statistical analyses, combined into a single measure of distortions
(see Bergman & Roediger, 1999). (1) Confusions were operationalized as idea units
that confused actions or characters in a story (e.g., ‘Linda’s cousin told Linda’s mum
about James’). (2) Conventionalizations were operationalized as transformations of
idea units according to Western cultural schemata (Bartlett, 1932; e.g., ‘Once they
exchanged vows, they sang a traditional song together’, ‘. . .she received a wedding
dress’). (3) Confabulations were mentions of idea units that were not presented in the
stories (e.g., ‘They had fruit biscuits and Milk at the ceremony’). (4) Confusions from
multiple sources were details that contained information originating from several
other stories and showed, rather than source confusion, blending of details from
multiple stories (e.g., ‘Mrs Smith who told Barbara’s parents about Michael’s
education, interests and personality’). (5) Deviation confusions reflected confusions
of details that changed in the content deviation conditions with typical details and
vice versa.
To measure recall organization, each recalled theme was assigned a sequential
number and all correct sequences were summed (e.g., themes ordered as 1, 2, 5, 6, 4,
3 include 2 correct sequences: 1, 2, and 5, 6). In order to make this measure
independent of quantity of recall, we calculated a proportion in the following way:
we divided the sum of correct sequences by the number of recalled themes deducted
by 1 (e.g., the sequence score for the previous example – two out of five correct
sequences – would be 0.40, and a completely accurate sequence of any number of
themes would gain a score of 1).
For deviation awareness, any mentioning of change of the ritual at the end of the story
was coded as awareness of the content deviation (e.g., ‘In the last story the boy and girl sat
next to each other and sang a traditional song instead of bowing to each other and
exchanging three drinks’); any mentioning of the change of story order was coded as
awareness of the order deviation (e.g., ‘The order of events leading up to the ceremony
changed’). Please note that we coded any mentioning of deviation(s) as deviation
awareness, including imprecise descriptions or attributions of the changes as (e.g., ‘The
storyline for the first two were the same; the last two stories changed slightly’ was coded
as awareness of the order deviation). General event representation was categorized based
on participants’ descriptions of the meaning of the stories (e.g., ‘Arranging some kind of
ceremony in which the boy and girl may eventually get married’ was coded as ‘marriage’;
see OSM, https://osf.io/jhrtc/).
All reproductions were coded by E. R. To obtain an estimate of inter-rater reliability,
two subsets (a random selection of 15 participants each) were independently coded by
two trained raters with resulting high agreement (Cohen’s kappa between .72 and .89 for
measures of themes, idea units, details, and recall organization). E. R.’s codes were used
for statistical analyses. The respective data and coding manual are available in OSM
(https://osf.io/jhrtc/).
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Statistical analyses
All measures were analysed using linear mixed models with fixed effects of session
(1/2/3/4), story (1/2/3/4), content (typical/deviation), and order (typical/deviation)
with all interactions, and random intercepts for participants and random slopes for
session (Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2014). Due to the number of effects in the full model
and an associated risk of increasing Type I error, we report analyses relevant for our
hypotheses in the main text (i.e., effects and interactions of session and deviation(s)
and effects and interactions of story and deviation(s)) and report significant interactions
involving session and story in the OSM (we had no theory-based expectations for these
effects, and there were just a few of them; https://osf.io/jhrtc/). Deviation awareness
analyses, which did not differentiate between deviations, included fixed effects of
session, story, and awareness (aware/not aware), and the same random effects as the
previous model.
Sessionwas treated as a continuous variable and centred. Storywas coded using simple
contrasts with Story 1 used as a reference level, so all models included three contrasts
between Story 1 and each of Stories 2, 3, and 4. Content and order deviations were coded
using simple contrasts, so the main effect of each factor represented a contrast between
the typical and deviation levels; deviation awarenesswas coded using simple contrasts, so
the main effect contrasted participants who were and who were not aware of any
deviation. All significant higher-order interactions that involved session or story and any
deviation were followed up with analyses at the level of stories. We present regression
coefficients alongwith 95%Confidence Intervals in brackets to show the size and range of
the effects (Cumming, 2012, 2014). Data and R script are available as OSM (https://osf.io/
jhrtc/).
Results
The results section is split into three parts. First, we report immediate recall results
bearing on recall quantity (themes, idea units, and details) and quality (distortions) related
to schema formation. This is followed by delayed recall findings focusing on general
performance differences across the stories, forgetting, and deviation effects. Finally, we
report analyses of deviation awareness and its relation to recall.
Immediate recall and schema formation
Figure 1 shows the increase in immediate recall of idea units across the four stories (see
Table 3 for other measures). As expected, having encountered a previous example of an
unfamiliar story helped participants remember the next example better, although there
was not much of a further increase for Stories 3 and 4, suggesting that a new schema may
have been established already after the first two instances. Recall of story themes, units,
and details increased by 16%, 17% and 19%, respectively, between immediate recall of
Story 1 and Story 2, themes: b = 0.16, [0.14, 0.18], t(420) = 16.28, p < .001; units:
b = 0.17, [0.15, 0.19], t(419) = 18.30, p < .001; details: b = 0.19, [0.16, 0.21],
t(419) = 13.51, p < .001. We do not report further contrasts between Story 1 and Stories
3 and 4 as they both show significant increases. There was one significant three-way
interaction between story and both deviations indicating that in contrast with Story 1,
recall of Story 3 was lower when both deviations were present. A follow-up analysis of
Story 3, however, did not reveal any significant results (highest t = 1.17, lowest p = .25),
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which means that the interaction depended on the difference between Story 1 and 3 and
not on the deviation effect.
Participants’ recall included between 0 and 6 distortions in each story (M = 0.99,
SD = 1.13), and the number of distortions decreased in later stories. The decrease was
gradual between Stories 1 and 3 and then levelled off, Stories 1 and 2: b = 0.26, [0.47,
0.04], t(420) = 2.31,p = .02; Stories 2 and3:b = 0.28, [0.48,0.07], t(141) = 2.62,
p = .01; Stories 3 and 4: b = 0.04, [0.48, 0.07], t(141) = 0.47, p = .64; Table 3. To
examine distortions that were in line with Western cultural schemata specifically, we
compared percentages of participants whose recall involved conventionalizations across
the four stories and found a broadly consistent pattern, although the differences were not
significant, Story 1: 10%, Story 2: 7%, Story 3: 6%, and Story 4: 2%; v2(3, N = 576) = 7.75,
p = .05.
In summary, analyses of immediate recall confirmed that participants learned the story
schema as they gathered more experience with the material. Participants recalled more
details, units, and even whole themes in later stories with most learning occurring
between the first two stories. Inversely related to the improvement in the quantity of
remembered material was a change in quality – alongside building a new schema for








































Figure 1. Immediate recall of idea units for typical/deviation content and order conditions. Error bars
represent 95% CIs of the means.
Table 3. Proportion of themes, idea units, and details, and number of distortions in immediate recall
Measure
Story
1 2 3 4
Themes 0.71 (0.15) 0.87 (0.12) 0.92 (0.12) 0.91 (0.12)
Idea units 0.65 (0.15) 0.82 (0.12) 0.86 (0.13) 0.86 (0.13)
Details 0.63 (0.19) 0.82 (0.14) 0.84 (0.15) 0.80 (0.16)
Distortions 1.34 (1.37) 1.08 (1.17) 0.80 (0.91) 0.76 (0.95)
Note. Statistics display means and standard deviations.
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other words, after repeated examples, participants were able to create representations
based on the material rather than deriving them from cultural schemata.
Delayed recall and deviation effects
Themes
The overall analysis showed, as would be expected, that participants recalled fewer
themes as delay increased, b = 0.09, [0.10, 0.07], t(132) = 10.83, p < .001. In
addition, there was a significant two-way interaction between story and the content
deviation and a significant three-way interaction between story and both deviations.
These interactions indicated that in contrast with Story 1, recall of Story 4was lowerwhen
the content or both deviations were present. A follow-up analysis of Story 4, however, did
not show a significant effect of any deviation (highest t = 1.68, lowest p = .10), which
again means that the interaction depended on the difference between Story 1 and 4 and
not on the deviation effect.
Idea units
Similarly to themes, the overall analysis showed forgetting, b = 0.05, [0.06, 0.04],
t(132) = 7.67, p < .001. In addition, there was a significant effect of story indicating that
recall of Story 3 was slightly higher than recall of Story 1, b = 0.01, [0.0003, 0.03],
t(1,946) = 1.99, p = .047. There were also significant two- and three-way interactions
between story and each and both deviations, all indicating that in contrast with Story 1,
recall of Story 4 was lower when a deviation was present. A follow-up analysis confirmed
that recall of Story 4 was 8% lower in the order deviation conditions than in the typical
order conditions, b = 0.08, [0.16, 0.01], t(141) = 2.28, p = .03; Figure 2. In other








































Figure 2. Delayed recall of idea units for typical/deviation content and order conditions collapsed
across delay. Error bars represent 95% CIs of the means.
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displays means and standard deviations for recall of idea units split by experimental
conditions.
Details
Similar to the previous measures, the overall analysis showed 8% forgetting between
sessions, b = 0.08, [0.09,0.07], t(129) = 17.70, p < .001; Table 4. There was some
indication of a primacy effect, as recall of Story 2 was significantly lower than recall of
Story 1, although the effect was very small, b = 0.02, [0.03, 0.0009], t(1,949) = 2.07,
p = .04. Recall of Story 4 was slightly higher than recall of Story 1 (b = 0.02, [0.0006,
0.03], t(1,949) = 2.02, p = .04), suggesting a small recency effect. In addition, therewere
significant two- and three-way interactions between story and each and both deviations in
the contrasts between Story 1 and Stories 3 and 4. Follow-up analyses of Story 3 and 4
revealed that recall of Story 4was 8% lower in the content deviation conditions than in the
typical content conditions, b = 0.08, [0.15, 0.01], t(143) = 2.31, p = .02 (see
Figure 3 and Table 4); there were no significant deviation effects analyses of Story 3
(highest t = 1.79, lowest p = .08).
In order tofindoutwhether the recall disruptive effect of the content deviation in Story
4 was due to participants not reporting the deviation details, we ran a parallel analysis in
whichwe excluded details that deviated in Story 4 in the content deviation conditions and
parallel details in the typical content conditions.11 The results suggested that this was the
case: there were no significant differences in recall of Story 4 between the deviation
content and typical content conditions after removal of the deviation details, b = 0.03,
[0.10, 0.04], t(143) = 0.94, p = .35; see Figure 3. This pattern of results was contrary to










































Figure 3. Delayed recall of story details for typical/deviation content and order conditions collapsed
across delay. Asterisk indicatesmeasure of details excluding deviation details (and parallel details in typical
content conditions). Error bars represent 95% CIs of the means.
11We re-calculated themeasure in the following way: from recall of Story 4 in all conditions, we excluded four details that changed
in the content deviation; then, we calculated a proportion of these 11 details.
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Internal intrusions
In each story, there was a maximum of 15 details the source of which could have been
confused with another story. Results of the main analysis revealed a non-significant effect
of session, indicating that such internal intrusions were relatively stable across delay,
b = 0.0001, [0.004, 0.004], t(141) = 0.01, p = .995. Next, there were main effects of
story revealing that participants showedmore internal intrusions in Story 2, 3, and 4 than
in Story 1, a pattern that shows indirect support for the primacy effect, Story 2: b = 0.04,
[0.03, 0.04], t(1,962) = 8.10, p < .001; Story 3: b = 0.06, [0.05, 0.06], t(1,962) = 12.81,
p < .001; Story 4: b = 0.02, [0.01, 0.03], t(1,962) = 4.41, p < .001; Figure 4. Finally,
































Figure 4. Internal intrusions in delayed recall for typical/deviation content and order conditions

































Figure 5. Distortions as a proportion of idea units in delayed recall for typical/deviation content and
order conditions collapsed across delay. Asterisk indicates measure of distortions excluding deviation
details (and parallel details in typical content conditions). Error bars represent 95% CIs of the means.
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contrasted with Story 1, there were fewer internal intrusions in Story 4 when order
deviated than when order was typical. A follow-up analysis of Story 4 confirmed this
pattern, b = 0.02, [0.04, 0.003], t(144) = 2.24, p = .03; Figure 4.
Distortions
There were between 0 and 8 distortions in delayed recall. The main analysis showed a
significant effect of session: there were more distortions as delay increased, b = 0.06,
[0.008, 0.12], t(140) = 2.21, p = .03, although the effect was very small and the most
substantive increase occurred between Session 1 and 2 (Session 1:M = 1.05, SD = 1.19;
Session 2: M = 1.25, SD = 1.22; Session 3: M = 1.20, SD = 1.28; Session 4: M = 1.27,
SD = 1.37). In addition, a significant two-way interaction between story and content
indicated that in contrast with Story 1, more distortions were reported in Story 4 in the
content deviation conditions. A follow-up analysis of Story 4 confirmed this pattern,
b = 0.63, [0.30, 0.97], t(141) = 3.72, p < .001.
Similar to the analysis of recalled details, we wanted to find out if the increase in recall
of distortions in Story 4 associated with the content deviation was driven by participants’
distortions of the deviation details. Therefore, we conducted an analysis in which
deviation details and parallel details in typical content conditions were excluded from
recall of Story 4.12 The results revealed a non-significant effect of content, b = 0.002,
[0.002, 0.005], t(142) = 0.92, p = .36; Figure 5, suggesting that participants in the
content deviation conditions distorted their recall of the Story 4 deviation details in
particular.
A focused analysis of conventionalizations revealed a pattern consistent with the
general distortion analysis: the percentages of participants demonstrating conventional-
izations in recall increased with delay from 4% to 5%, 6%, and 9% across sessions, v2(3,
N = 2,276) = 12.91, p = .005, and there were no significant differences across stories,
v2(3, N = 2,276) = 3.01, p = .39. Conventionalizations were more frequent among
participants in the deviation content conditions than in the typical content conditions (8%
versus 4%, respectively, v2(3, N = 2,276) = 20.06, p < .001; there were no significant
differences between typical and deviation order conditions, v2(3, N = 2,276) = 1.15,
p = .28).
Recall organization
Our main interest in looking at recall organization was to see if any potential decrease in
recall due to order deviation (i.e., lower recall of idea units in Story 4)wouldbepairedwith
lower correct sequencing. The main analysis revealed main effects of session and story
showing a decrease in correct sequencing as delay increased, b = 0.06, [0.08,0.05],
t(130) = 8.04, p < .001, and lower correct sequencing in Stories 3 and 4 than in Story 1,
Story 3: b = 0.03, [0.06,0.01], t(1,952) = 2.36, p = .02; Story 4: b = 0.08, [0.10,
0.05], t(1,952) = 5.31, p < .001. There was also a significant two-way interaction
between story and the order deviation indicating lower correct sequencing in Story 4 than
in Story 1 in order deviation conditions, which was confirmed in a follow-up analysis of
Story 4, b = 0.16, [0.22, 0.09], t(133) = 4.79, p < .001; Figure 6.
12 In order to create ameasure that would be comparable across all stories, we calculated distortions as a proportion of units in the
following way: we divided the number of distortions by 76 for Stories 1, 2, and 3, and by 72 for Story 4 (deviation details excluded).
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What do analyses of delayed recall tell us overall? All measures of recall quantity
showed forgetting with time. Distortions in recall, however, increased with delay – a
pattern that may indicate the perseverance of transformations (including those guided by
old cultural schema). Next, we found very small direct support for general primacy and
recency effects (wewill elaborate on three indirect indicators of primacy in theDiscussion
section, though). With regards to deviation effects, the content deviation impacted recall
in the opposite direction than we expected based on previous literature using familiar
materials. Participants in the content deviation conditions recalled fewer details andmore
distortions in Story 4, largely because they failed to report and/or transformed the
deviation details. The order deviation, however, showed an expected effect: participants
reported (1) fewer idea units from Story 4 and (2) were less able to recall the story
according to the sequence it was revealed when the order deviated. We now turn to
analyses pertaining to deviation awareness.
Deviation awareness
At the end of the final delayed recall protocol, we asked participants to describe any
changes between the stories they might have noticed. Twenty-seven participants
mentioned that a change of the ritual that the couple performed occurred, which was
coded as awareness of the content deviation (44% of participants in the content deviation
conditions), and 25 participants mentioned a that a change in the order of the events in a
story occurred, whichwas coded as awareness of the order deviation (41% of participants
in the order deviation conditions).
Awareness of any deviations and recall of themes, idea units, and details
Our main interest in looking at deviation awareness was to see if awareness of any
deviation would be associated with better recall. We found that participants in the
deviation conditions who reported a deviation recalled 11%more story themes, b = 0.11,



































Figure 6. Sequencing in delayed recall for typical/deviation content and order conditions collapsed
across delay. Error bars represent 95% CIs of the means.
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t(92) = 2.96, p = .004, and 8% more details, b = 0.08, [0.008, 0.15], t(92) = 2.18,
p = .03, than participants who did not report that a deviation occurred. In addition, for
each measure, there were significant interactions between awareness and story
suggesting that the effect of awareness was stronger in recall of Story 4 than in Story 1.
Follow-up analyses of Story 4 confirmed this pattern for themes, b = 0.15, [0.04, 0.26],
t(92) = 2.76, p = .007, idea units, b = 0.15, [0.07, 0.24], t(92) = 3.44, p < .001, and
details,13 b = 0.12, [0.04, 0.20], t(92) = 2.75, p = .007; Figure 7.
Awareness of any deviations and internal intrusions and distortions
Deviation awarenesswas not associatedwith significant differences in internal intrusions,
b = 0.006, [0.03. 0.01], t(92) = 0.60, p = .55, and distortions, b = 0.009, [0.31,
0.33], t(92) = 0.06, p = .96.
Awareness of any deviations and recall organization
The main effect of deviation awareness was not significant, b = 0.06, [0.001, 0.13],
t(92) = 1.92, p = .06, but there was an interaction between awareness and story
specifying that in contrast with Story 1 (where there was no difference in sequencing
based on deviation awareness), sequencing of Story 4 was higher for participants who
reported a deviation than those who did not report a deviation. A follow-up analysis
of Story 4 confirmed this pattern, b = 0.09, [0.01, 0.17], t(92) = 2.31, p = .02;
Figure 7.
Overall, there were similar – and relatively low – levels of reporting the content and
order deviation. This pattern, at least in case of the surprisingly low degree of reporting
the content deviation (relative to previous research; Rubınova et al., 2020), comple-
ments low recall of deviation details: it seems that participants did not pay much
attention to the deviation details (or in general). Analyses of deviation awareness and
Figure 7. Deviation awareness and recall of detail and sequencing in delayed recall for typical/deviation
content and order conditions collapsed across delay. Error bars represent 95% CIs of the means.
13 A parallel analysis with details excluding deviation details (and parallel details in typical content conditions) showed a consistent
effect (b = 0.10, [0.01, 0.18], t(92) = 2.31, p = .02).
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overall recall confirmed this idea: participants who reported that a deviation occurred
remembered more than participants who did not report a deviation, and this effect was
strongest in Story 4, where deviation awareness was also associated with better recall
organization.
Discussion
Imagine a European couple participating in a series of Japanese tea ceremonies or
employees in a manufacture adjusting to machine production. In both scenarios, those
involved (need to) become familiar with a completely new and perhaps strange
environment. Learning would likely entail a series of repeated events and would lead to
the emergence of a new knowledge structure – a schema. We aimed to study memory
processes in such scenarios by presenting participants with four versions of an unfamiliar
story and measuring their learning and delayed recall with delays increasing from 10 min
up to 1 month after presentation.
General and schema effects in recall of repeated unfamiliar events
In immediate recall of each story, we found that memory performance improved as
participants learned more stories. Improvement was quantitative and qualitative.
Quantitatively, participants reported more themes, idea units, and story-specific
details in later stories. This pattern suggested that the representation of the first
story served as ‘scaffolding’ for the recall of later stories and as foundation for the
building of a new schema (e.g., Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014;
Minsky, 1974; Schank, 1999). Qualitatively, distortions of parts of the stories,
including conventionalizations that were in line with Western cultural schemata
(Bartlett, 1932), occurred less frequently in immediate recall of later stories. This
pattern of substituting early distortions with new accurate representations
suggested a process of gradual separation of the new schema (emerging through
experience with the stories) from old cultural schemata through which partici-
pants, at least partly, initially comprehended and interpreted the stories (e.g., Cole
& Cole, 2000).
In delayed reproduction, measures of quantity and accuracy of recall indicated
forgetting while reporting of distortions slightly increased, which is consistent with
results from studies investigating repeated retrieval of a single unfamiliar story
(Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Wagoner & Gillespie, 2014). In addition, the persever-
ance of distortions in recall suggested that old cultural schemata remained blended
into the new schema (e.g., mentioning that the couple ‘exchanged vows’ at the end
of the ceremony), where they served a function of conserving memory (Ost & Costall,
2002).
Delayed recall analyses showed, contrary to our expectations, only a limited direct
support for primacy and recency effects in the recall of details. Indirectly, however,
there were three indicators of a primacy effect. First, comparing Figures 1 (immediate
recall) and 2 (delayed recall), we find that recall of Story 1 remained stable (at ~65%),
while recall of the other stories decreased by almost 20% on average (themes and
details showed similar patterns). Second, analyses of delayed recall of details (reported
in OSM) revealed that participants forgot details from Stories 2, 3, and 4 faster than
details from Story 1. Third, details of Story 1 seemed to have stronger source links as
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more source confusions occurred in the other stories. In brief, the first story was
more immune to forgetting than the consecutive stories (see Connolly et al., 2016;
MacLean et al., 2018; Roberts et al., 2015; Rubınova et al., 2020), but a direct primacy
effect was probably obscured by a concurrent schema-establishment effect (as seen in
Figure 1).
Deviation effects and deviation awareness in delayed recall of repeated unfamiliar
events
Next, our study investigated the effects of content and order deviations on recall.
Previous research using familiar materials indicated that a content deviation may lead
to an increase in recall (e.g., Davidson, 1994; MacLean et al., 2018), while an order
deviation may lead to a decrease in recall (Rubınova et al., 2020). Our results were,
however, only partly consistent with previous findings. Notably, participants had
difficulty remembering the content deviation details, and these details became
distorted more often than typical details.14 The order deviation had an expected
negative effect on recall, although it was limited to Story 4. This lower recall was
accompanied by lower level of recall organization – participants often failed to recall
themes of the final story in the sequence in which they were presented, a finding that
is in line with previous research (Rubınova et al., 2020). Why were these effects
limited to the story in which the deviation occurred, and why did we find an opposite
effect of the content deviation? As we will elaborate below, we speculate that due to
the use of complex unfamiliar stimuli, schema development in our study may have
been at earlier stages than in previous studies.
It is assumed in repeated-event research using familiar materials that new schemata
are established with the early instances and that each consecutive instance
strengthens the schema (Fivush, 1984). Farrar and Boyer-Pennington (1999; see also
Farrar & Goodman, 1992) use ‘schema-confirmation’ as a term for the first stage of
schema development, in which individuals look for a reference that would help them
comprehend the experience. In the process of schema-confirmation, schema-typical
details receive attention until an appropriate reference schema is found, and the
authors emphasize that at this stage, information is remembered only if it is part of
the schema, which is unlikely for instance-specific or deviation details (Farrar &
Boyer-Pennington, 1999). Only once a reference schema is confirmed, a second stage
(termed ‘schema-deployment’) can follow, during which attention can ‘be directed
toward the processing of new, and possibly inconsistent, information’ (1999, p. 268).
Critically, according to the authors, processing may not at all reach the second stage
when new schemata are developing due to attention demands (1999; see also Danby,
Sharman, Brubacher, & Powell, 2019).
Our findings are consistent with this model and suggest that schema development
did not reach the second stage: in delayed recall, deviation details were scarcely
reported and often distorted, and participants had difficulty remembering the sequence
of a story that unfolded in a different order. In addition, deviation awareness was
14 Connolly et al. (Experiment 3, 2016) reported a similar pattern when they compared reports about a deviation between
children from two deviation groups. Children from a discrete interruption group reported more incorrect details about the
deviation than children from a group in which the interruption lead to a change in behaviour of the main actor for the rest of the
event. The nature of this comparison is, however, different from our study, where we compared recall of specific details that were
either typical or deviated.
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relatively low (~40% for both content and order deviation). It seems that participants did
not have attentional resources that would enable them to process the deviation details
or to encode the new sequence – they were only able to maintain information that was
consistent with the emerging schema (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 1999; Farrar &
Goodman, 1992). Findings from previous studies using familiar materials would, in
contrast, fitwith the second stage of schemadevelopment. There, content deviationwas
associated with high awareness (Rubınova et al., 2020), and content deviation effects
were explained through active processing of the deviation and contrasting the deviation
instance with typical instances, thus leading to enhanced recall of the deviation details,
the whole deviation instance, or all instances in the series (Connolly et al., 2016;
MacLean et al., 2018). The order deviation, as reported by Rubınova et al. (2020), was
associated with low awareness, and the order deviation effects were explained through
undermining the newly established simple schema, thus leading to disrupted recall of
the whole series of instances.
Finally, our study investigated deviation awareness and its role in recall. In linewith our
predictions, reporting a deviation was associated with higher recall, and the difference
wasmost apparent in recall of the deviation story (Story 4). This relationship supports the
idea that participants who paid more attention to the materials (1) more frequently
noticed or remembered that a deviation occurred, and (2) had overall better memory of
the stories.
Limitations
This study had two main limitations. First, we administered all stories during one session,
which is an unlikely (although not impossible) scenario for repeated events occurring in
daily life where instances may be separated by days, weeks, or even months. There were
mainly practical reasons leading to this methodological decision – conducting this study
across multiple days while maintaining the sample size would not have been feasible for
us, so we needed to admit some reduction in external validity. On the other hand, single-
session (as opposed to spaced) presentation might have contributed to faster schema
development (Price, Connolly, & Gordon, 2006). Second, we only investigated effects of
deviations that occurred in the final story. Due to the nature of our study, we wanted
participants to gain as much experience with thematerials as possible before introducing
the deviation.We, therefore, do not knowwhat effectswe could expect if deviationswere
included in one of the middle stories or in the first story.
Conclusion
Our investigation is a step in broadening our understanding of cognitive processes that
contribute to autobiographical memory and has potential implications for applied
investigative interviewing. People may encounter events that they do not fully
comprehend in various contexts. When that happens, they are likely to interpret these
events through knowledge they already possess, which may lead to distortions of some
pieces of information. It is only with repeated experience that better understanding of
what is (and perhaps was) going on is gained and that, at least some, distortions are
corrected thanks to the emergence of a new schema. An instance from a repeated event
sometimes differs from other instances – theremay be changes inwhat happens and/or in
how the event unfolds. Contrary to intuition, such changesmay not be remembered at all,
especially if the repeated event is unfamiliar and the schema is in the early stages of
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development. In investigative settings, when such unfamiliar repeated events become of
interest, it seems that, if there is a delay, targeting the first event during an interview may
lead tomost correct reporting. In addition, investigators should be sensitive to indications
that an event differed. Although not many people would notice that an unfamiliar
repeated event included a deviation, those who would notice and remember such
deviation tend to recall more information overall.
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‘There was a girl named Barbara and a boy named Michael. Mrs Smith, who was Michael’s
aunt, went to Barbara’s house to meet with her parents. Mrs Smith told them about
Michael’s character, family and education. Two days later, Michael’s parents called on the
services of a psychic. He choseMarch 3rd to send a “saju tanja” to Barbara’s house.On that
day, Barbara’s family received a box containing the “saju tanja”, on which the hour, day,
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month, and year ofMichael’s birthwerewritten. Therewas also awhite blouse and a green
skirt for Barbara. Barbara’s parents agreed about the day for the ceremony and told
Michael’s family. On the day of the ceremony, Michael dressed himself in blue clothes.
When Michael and his parents entered Barbara’s house, Michael bowed to Barbara’s
father. Then, Michael gave Barbara’s father a wooden goose that he had brought from his
house. The company went to a hall. There was a cake, some fruit and a bottle of wine.
Michael and Barbara bowed to each other and exchanged three cups of wine. Barbara’s
father, standing next to a wooden pillar, said: “This is the happiest day of my life”’.
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